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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4266 
_____________ 
 
B&M AUTO SALVAGE AND TOWING, LLC, 
 d/b/a E-Z JOE'S USED AUTO PARTS, LLC;  
 ROBERT HOFFMAN; MICHELE HOFFMAN, 
                                                                                     Appellants 
 v. 
 
 TOWNSHIP OF FAIRFIELD; RICHARD DEVILLASANTA;  
GENEVA GRIFFIN  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
District Court No. 1-11-cv-02107 
District Judge: The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 18, 2014)  
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This civil rights action arises out of a delay in the issuance by Fairfield 
Township, New Jersey, of the 2009 annual business license to Robert and Michelle 
Hoffman, who owned and operated B & M Auto Salvage and Towing, LLC, doing 
business as E-Z Joe’s Used Auto Parts, LLC (collectively referred to as the 
Hoffmans).  According to the Hoffmans, they purchased E-Z Joe’s in December of 
2007 and obtained a business license in March of 2008.  The issuance of the 2009 
business license, however, was delayed.  As a result, the Hoffmans asserted that 
they were unable to sell E-Z Joe’s by the closing date established by an agreement 
of sale they had entered into with a third party.   
 Thereafter, the Hoffmans filed this civil action in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, asserting both federal and state law claims. 
The Hoffmans asserted that they had been deprived of their substantive and 
procedural due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 
addition, the Hoffmans alleged that the Township and Richard DeVillasanta, the 
Township’s Clerk and Administrator, were liable under state law for negligent 
retention and supervision of an employee, namely Geneva Griffin, the Township’s 
Deputy Clerk.  The Hoffmans also asserted against the Township, DeVillasanta, 
and Griffin a claim of tortious interference with their contract of sale.  After 
discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township, 
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DeVillasanta, and Griffin.  This timely appeal followed.1   
 We will not disturb the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
procedural due process claim.2  “The fundamental requirement of due process is 
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The business license at issue required the submission of an 
annual application and payment of the proper fee.  Although the Hoffmans 
submitted an initial check for $150.00 with the application, the required fee was 
$200.00.  Once the balance of the fee was paid in April of 2009, the application 
was reviewed, investigated, and issued.  Indeed, the Hoffmans acknowledge in 
their brief that “[t]he Township, when presented with the application, approved it 
almost immediately.”  Appellants’ Br. at 19.   
 Nor is there any basis for setting aside the grant of summary judgment on 
the negligent supervision and retention of Griffin as an employee.  In Di Cosala v. 
Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court “recognize[d] 
the tort of negligent . . . retention of an incompetent, unfit or dangerous 
                                                 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order 
granting summary judgment is plenary.  Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 
170, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is properly granted when there “is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
2 The Hoffmans concede that the substantive due process claim lacks merit and 
therefore we need not discuss that claim. 
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employee[.]”  The Court instructed that “[a]n employer will only be held 
responsible for the torts of its employees beyond the scope of the employment 
where it knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or 
dangerous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen that such 
qualities created a risk of harm to other persons.”  Id. 
 The Hoffmans do not take issue with the District Court’s determination that 
the Township and its officials did not know of Griffin’s alleged dangerous 
attributes.  Instead, they assert that the District Court erred by failing to consider 
certain evidence that demonstrated the employer should have known of Griffin’s 
“dangerous attributes.”  We are not persuaded.  The evidence cited does not 
establish that the Township should have known that Griffin was a dangerous 
employee, posing a risk of harm to the public.   
 Finally, we consider the Hoffmans’ claim of tortious interference with the 
contract of sale for E-Z Joe’s.  We will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  In Nostrame v. Santiago, 61 A.3d 893, 901 (N.J. 2013), the 
New Jersey Supreme Court observed that a tortious interference with contract 
claim requires establishing that the interference “‘caus[ed] the third person not to 
perform the contract.’”  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766).  Here, 
as the District Court noted, there is no dispute that it was the Hoffmans, not E-Z 
Joe’s potential buyer, who cancelled the contract of sale before it expired.  Thus, 
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even assuming there was interference by Griffin, such interference did not cause 
the cancellation of the sales contract.   
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
 
